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Abstract
With the approaching implementation of § 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there is widespread criticism of the
enormous costs of complying with the section. Although §
404 arguably improves investor confidence by making the
financial condition of a company more transparent,
businesses argue that the costs are simply too high. The
question remains as to whether high costs are a good enough
reason to expose investors to the type of fraud SarbanesOxley protects, or whether there are public policy reasons
to ease the burdens.
This note examines the effects of § 404 on small
businesses, and argues that public policy not only permits
the SEC to ease the burden for small firms, but demands it.
The high compliance costs implicate public policy by
effectively pricing small businesses out of the public
capital markets. Recent discoveries about the importance
of small business to the economy reveal that this has the
serious potential to send industry and the economy as a
whole into ruin.
Moreover, the effects of § 404 on investor confidence
are uncertain at best, with reason to believe that the
financial transparency it creates does as much harm to
investors as it does good. This is especially true for
small businesses, which do not have as much of an impact on
investor confidence as the Enrons and Worldcoms. As a
result, it is imperative that the SEC remove some or all of
§ 404’s burdens on small businesses.
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I.

Introduction
When Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(“Sarbanes-Oxley”)

1

over the Enron debacle, debates raged

over the impact the new, stringent rules would have on
public companies.2

These debates have been reinvigorated

almost four years later as the most costly and
controversial section of the Act, § 404, is implemented.3
While on the surface this fight may seem like Corporate
America’s attempt to protect its profits, in reality it is
more than that: it is a fight for the survival of the small
public company, for the economy’s elusive resurgence, and
essentially even for the American dream.
As a response to the financial reporting scandals of
Enron and others, Sarbanes-Oxley is a gallant attempt to
protect the public at large from big bad business.
Ironically, though, big business has taken the new
requirements in stride while many small firms are facing a
mortal wound.

The debate now is to what extent small

public companies should be made to pay the same costs as
big ones.
On the one hand, financial reporting fraud is a real
problem, and some kind of response was necessary.
proved that.

Enron

Further, a search beneath the big-business

publicity of Enron and Worldcom reveals that financial
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reporting fraud is not limited to handful of bad apples; it
impacts the entire market, regardless of firm size.4

In

fact, smaller firms are more likely than larger ones to
commit other types of fraud, such as pump-and-dump and
Ponzi schemes.5
On the other hand, implementing Sarbanes-Oxley as is
would cost so much to small businesses that it has the
serious potential to eliminate their access to the capital
markets.6

Without access to the public finance market,

small businesses cannot grow, and the economy will lose the
advantages in technology and efficiency that it has enjoyed
for most of the past century.

Perhaps more importantly,

overburdening small companies could carry significant
social and political consequences, as the American public
has always considered the promotion of small business
important to American capitalism and democracy.
This debate raises several, seemingly disparate public
policy issues.

Should investors be exposed to fraud just

to protect a quaint American ideal?

Are there compelling

public policy reasons to promote small public companies?
Does the Act actually further any fundamental concerns of
the public?

This note examines the government policies

affected by Sarbanes-Oxley, and analyzes whether it
furthers or detracts from the fundamental concerns of
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society at large.

Part II briefly explains the major

provisions of the Act and their intended purpose.

Part III

examines the public policy concerns affected by the Act.
Part IV presents the evidence to date on how the Act has
affected these concerns, and how it will affect them in the
future.

Part V weighs the competing interests, and

concludes that burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley must be reduced
for small firms.

The final parts address the possible

solutions and the prospects for change.

II.

Overview of Sarbanes-Oxley
Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley as a direct response

to the financial reporting frauds of Enron, Worldcom, and
others.7

It gave the Securities and Exchange Commission

(“SEC”) a mandate to adopt a broad array of rules,
ostensibly to prevent this type of fraud from occurring in
the future.

Following this mandate, the SEC has adopted

rules enhancing financial disclosure, improving the
independence of auditors, and requiring directors to
certify financial reports.

Further, the Act itself

enhanced the criminal and civil liability of directors,
created a new administrative agency to govern auditors, and
gave the SEC increased enforcement powers.

While the

primary focus of the current Sarbanes-Oxley debate is on §
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404, each of the other provisions of the Act has a
substantial effect on the policy issues that § 404
implicates.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to point out
that Sarbanes-Oxley makes no relevant distinction between
large and small companies.8

The Act applies to any issuer9

required to make periodic reports to the SEC.10

As a

result, if a small business wants to go public it will have
to comply with the stringent requirements of SarbanesOxley.
A.

Section 404

The primary focus of Sarbanes-Oxley critics, and of
this note, is on the § 404 requirements regarding internal
controls over financial reporting.11

In particular, § 404

requires that management include in its annual report to
the SEC (Form 10-k or Form 10-KSB) an assessment of the
effectiveness of these controls.12

The section also

requires the company’s external auditor to attest to, and
report on, management’s assessment.13

In its implementation

of this section, the SEC also required disclosure of any
material weaknesses in the internal controls, a requirement
not mandated by § 404.14
The ultimate goal of this section is to ensure the
accuracy of financial reports, and thus improve investor
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confidence.15

There had been some concern among regulators

that a “‘corner-cutting’ culture” had developed among
public companies in an effort to reduce costs, which
resulted in internal controls unable to adequately prevent
financial reporting fraud.16

The hope is that the new

controls requirements will cast a broad enough net to catch
most fraudulent activity, and thus make investments less
risky.17

Logically, investors would be more willing to

invest in a safer venture.18
Largely ignored at first,19 § 404 is now the source of
Sarbanes-Oxley’s most staunch criticism.20

The primary

concern is the enormous costs, which are mostly
attributable to fees associated with the auditor assessment
and attestation requirements.

As a result of the new rules

affecting auditors, the accounting industry has responded
to its § 404 duties with what some commenters believe is
undue vigor.21

Part III of this note will discuss the

effects of § 404 more fully.
B.

CEO and CFO Certifications

Section 404 is not the only provision causing
substantial public dissent.

The provisions initially

thought to be the most controversial were § 302 and 906,
which require a company’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”)
and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), or persons serving
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similar functions, to certify as to the accuracy of the
company’s financial reports.22

Before, CEOs and CFOs at

least publicly claimed that it was rare for them to review
periodic reports; they would be prepared by the company’s
lawyers and accountants, and the managers would simply sign
off on them.23

The result was that it was harder to pin

criminal liability on the individual managers.24

In recent

trials of pre-Sarbanes-Oxley frauds, some executives have
escaped liability by characterizing themselves as oblivious
to the contents of financial statements.25

Sarbanes-Oxley

has taken that argument away.
Now, § 302 and 906 make the CEO and CFO sign a sworn
statement that they have reviewed the reports, and that
they fairly present the financial condition of the
company.26

This makes it much easier to pin Rule 10b-5

liability, the SEC primary weapon against fraud, on these
managers.

Before Enron, individuals generally were

“primary” violators of 10b-5 only if a material
misstatement or omission was directly attributed to that
person at the time of dissemination.27

In effect, the

certifications force them to make a public statement,
specifically attributed to them, stating that the financial
reports are accurate.

This makes them primary violators

for any fraud in the reports, liable under rule 10b-5.28
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In

addition, the Act added a new crime, making it criminal
just to violate the requirements of § 906.29

This allows

the Justice Department to prosecute without worrying about
those pesky 10b-5 requirements.
The debate over the Act’s certification requirements
raises issues that deserve a fuller treatment than this
note can provide.

To what extent should CEOs and CFOs be

made accountable for fraudulent reporting by their company?
Should they have to pay for the actions of a rogue employee
if they had no practical way of preventing them?

Also, too

much time spent on fraud prevention would take away from
their primary duty: managing a profitable corporation for
the benefit of its shareholders.30

It will suffice for this

note to say that certification has had a profound effect on
the accountability of managing officers.
C.

Criminal and Civil Penalties

In addition to casting a wider net to catch defrauding
managers, Sarbanes-Oxley also enhanced how much that net
could sting:

The Act aggressively enhanced both criminal

and civil penalties, and handed the SEC more powerful
enforcement tools.

The maximum penalty for criminal

securities fraud is now twenty years, up from ten.31
Maximum fines were increased from $1,000,000 to $5,000,000
for natural persons, and from $2,500,000 to $25,000,000 for
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corporations.32

The maximum penalties for mail and wire

fraud were also increased,33 as were those for violations of
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).34
The Act also added entirely new crimes.

One is the

certification failure provision discussed above.35

Others

include alteration or destruction of documents,36
destruction of corporate audit records,37 and attempt or
conspiracy to commit mail fraud.38
Although the Act did not directly increase civil
liability in this way, it does help investors actually get
the damages due to them.

First, civil damage awards for

securities violations now survive bankruptcy.39

Second,

under the Fair Funds provision, any civil penalties the SEC
receives for a violation can be given to victims of that
violation.40
Complementing the changes in accountability are two
sections giving additional authority to the SEC.

One

grants the Commission the authority to temporarily freeze
“extraordinary payments” made during an investigation.41
The other allows the SEC to prohibit any person who
violates securities antifraud provisions from serving as
the director of any public company.42
D.

Accounting Changes
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One significant part of Sarbanes-Oxley is its impact
on the accounting profession, and more specifically the
relationship between public companies and its independent
auditor.

Much of the blame for Enron was placed on Arthur

Anderson, Enron’s auditor, for being either unwilling or
unable to keep Enron’s management within the bounds of the
law.43

Most commenters believe that accounting firms simply

had no leverage over their big business clients; if they
insisted on proper internal controls to ensure accurate
financial reporting, their clients would simply look
elsewhere for auditing services.44
The Act takes several steps to combat this problem.
First, it established the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”), whose task is essentially to
audit the auditors.45

Second, it enhanced the independence

of a public company’s audit committee.

The committee must

now be composed solely of outside directors, and has sole
authority with regards to the auditor and the audit.46
Third, it enhanced the independence of the auditors
themselves.

To complete any public company audit, an

auditor must register with the PCAOB,47 cannot perform any
other function for the issuer,48 and must rotate the person
heading the audit.49

While these changes have shifted the

balance of power over financial reporting to the

11

accountants, allowing them to be better “gatekeepers,”50 the
vigor with which the profession has responded has had a
significant effect on costs of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance.51
E.

Other Provisions

Section 404 was not the only change to disclosure
requirements.

Other changes include disclosure of off-

balance sheet transactions,52 disclosure of whether the CFO
is subject to a code of ethics,53 disclosure of changes to
any such code of ethics,54 and disclosure of whether there
is a financial expert on the audit committee.55

Each of

these disclosure items was a response to what Congress
believed to be widespread weaknesses in corporate
governance.56

In addition, the SEC now requires financial

projections to follow certain accounting standards,57 and
has accelerated the reporting requirement for any change in
stock ownership by an insider.58
Other provisions only affect business indirectly.

For

example, the SEC implemented Part 205, dealing with an
attorney’s ethical duties, to comply with § 307 of the
Act.59

The Act also instituted new protections for

whistleblowers and informants.60

Along with the changes to

the accounting industry,61 these elements address the notion
that the so-called “gatekeepers” of public companies, their
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employees, accountants and attorneys, were either unwilling
or unable to keep management in check.62
Congress has attacked financial reporting fraud with a
broad edged sword in response to a handful of highly
publicized scandals.

Did they overdo it?

Part III

examines the fundamental public policy considerations
affected by this attack.

The final Parts examine the

effect that it has had, and will have, on those concerns.

III. Public Policy Considerations
Does Sarbanes-Oxley further or detract from public
policy?

The short answer is both; it arguably protects

investors from fraud,63 but makes it cost-prohibitive for
most small businesses to enter the public market for
financing.64

The long answer requires an analysis of the

fundamental concerns of society affected by the Act, and
then an examination of how greatly the Act affects them.
This part discusses the competing public policy concerns of
investors and small business, why they are important, and
how fundamental they are to society.

Part IV examines the

extent the Act furthers the concerns of investors, and
detracts from the concerns of small business.
A.

Investor Protection
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In general, the purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley is the same
as that of the ’33 Act and the ’34 Act: to protect
investors by ensuring that their investments do not succumb
to fraud.65

Regulation serves two vital protective

functions, one socio-political and the other economic.

The

primary concern is the normative, social idea that fraud is
simply wrong.66
This ethical consideration has been the primary
driving force of regulation since its inception.
Securities regulation originated to protect the gullible
American public from traveling swindlers, who offered
“speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many
feet of ‘blue sky.’”67
prevalent.68

Today this ethical ideal is still

Even in an age wherein economics affects

decisions far more often than ethics, there is still a
sense that investors must be protected from fraud simply
because society believes it is wrong to defraud investors.
It would be a farce, however, to say that the only
benefit of regulation is to society’s sense of right and
wrong.

Regulation is also vital to the economy.

With such

a tenacious watchdog as the SEC and its regulatory
authority, investors can be more confident that the
securities they purchase are, if not sound investments, at
least not shams.

If investors know the securities they
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purchase are less likely to involve fraud, they will value
their investments more, and thus will invest more.69

This,

in turn, stimulates the economy as a whole and benefits
everyone.

In an unregulated, caveat emptor regime where

investors have no information about the validity of an
offering, the market would eventually become flooded with
scam securities.70

Investment would dry up and the economy

would stagnate.71
The concerns served by regulation are unquestionably
vital.

The importance of protecting the economy is well-

documented and is beyond the scope of this note.

The

normative value of preventing fraud is no less important;
certainly it is as socially valuable as preventing any
criminal activity. As such, government policy must ensure
that securities offerings are adequately regulated.

The

Enron scandal caused a mass belief that the current
regulations were inadequate, and that something like
Sarbanes-Oxley was necessary.

At the very least it was

certain that reporting fraud existed in all types of public
companies.72

Even if the previous regulations were truly

inadequate,73 however, the Act’s effectiveness at furthering
these public policy concerns is questionable, while its
negative impact on other concerns is both certain and
substantial.74
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B.

Small Business

Without question, Sarbanes-Oxley negatively affects
the ability of small firms to turn to the public market for
financing because of the substantial increased costs of
compliance.75

Accordingly, two questions must be answered

to determine whether the Act implicates public policy:
First, to what extent should government policy promote the
growth and well-being of small business?

Second, how

important is a small firm’s ability to enter the public
capital market?

As it turns out, the ability of small

businesses to go public is vital not only for their own
growth and well-being, but for the growth and well-being of
industry and the economy as a whole.
1.

Economic Importance of Small Business

The economic importance of small firms has been both
ignored and misguided until quite recently.76

For years,

most scholars attributed the dominance of the American
economy to the development of big business.77

Particularly

during the cold war, many economists even argued that small
firms, which do not produce enough to take advantages of
economies of scale,78 were actually a drain on efficiency.79
These analysts advocated any public policy that favored
high industry concentration, with more large corporations
and fewer small firms.80

With the advent of revolutionary
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new theory and methodology, however, analysts have
completely changed this belief.
Examining the organization of industry as a dynamic
institution as opposed to a static one, economists now
understand why small firms continue to be prevalent despite
their supposed inefficiencies.

Small and young companies

are a primary source of innovation,81 and are a significant,
if not the primary source of new jobs.82

Viewed in a

dynamic frame, these aspects of small companies make them
essential in the industrial renewal process as agents of
change.

Large firms have such large and complex

infrastructures that they are simply not able to adapt to
changes in technology.

Instead, individuals with “a given

endowment of new knowledge” are better served by
entrepreneurship than by employment in large firms.83
Without small business, this new knowledge would be underutilized and industry would not evolve as fast as it has in
recent years.84
This result makes empirical sense.

Especially in

high-technology fields, most break-through innovations come
from start-up companies.

Even in the lower-technology

steel industry, new “mini-mills” entering the market have
become profitable despite the fact that the incumbent giant
mills had been losing money for years.85
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Classical

industrial organization theory could not explain how firms
could enter a market where there were no excess profits.86
Economists now know that the success of small firms like
these mini-mills is due to their flexibility and their
ability to incorporate new knowledge in ways large firms
simply cannot.87
As such, the importance of small firms is that they
allow industry to the development and growth.

Any policy

that stunts the growth of small business has the potential
to hurt the economy as a whole.

Nevertheless, this is not

the only compelling reason to support small business;
protecting small business is also important to American
society itself as a symbol of America’s identity and the
American Dream.
2.

Sociopolitical Importance of Small Business

While the economic importance of Small businesses is
just now being uncovered, the socio-political importance
has been recognized since colonial times.

Small firms

represent “‘a cornerstone of American democracy,’” and are
seen as an institution that offers everyone a chance at the
American Dream.88

In fact, the small firm is the single

most important vehicle for dissolving class barriers and
promoting more equal economic opportunity.

Since this

country’s inception, entrepreneurship provided Americans
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from every social background social mobility.89

Small

enterprises are particularly important for minorities and
immigrants to integrate into American society.90

This has

also been important for women, who have faced and continue
to face discrimination that hinders their ability to
compete for jobs.91
Small business is not just important for these select
groups, however; it is important to the entirety of
American society.

Even when big business was thought to be

the driving force of the economy, the Government still felt
pressure to protect the little guy.92

This is why there was

such vigorous antitrust prosecutions following World War
II,93 and again in recent years.94

This is also why the

Small Business Administration survived President Reagan’s
attempt to get rid of it in the 1980s.95

The well-being of

small business in America is indeed a driving political
force.96

It is no wonder that the SEC, which initially

refused to ease the § 404 burdens for small businesses,97 is
now facing tremendous pressure to change its position.98
Whether to protect the economy or keep the American
Dream alive, government policy must ensure that small
businesses continue to thrive.
put it:
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As one prominent economist

The policy implications are clear. The crucial
barometer for economic and social well-being is the
continued high level of creation of new and small
firms in all sectors of the economy by all segments of
society. It should be the role of government policy
to facilitate that process by eliminating barriers to
entry and exit, lowering transaction costs, and
minimizing anticompetitive behavior by large firms.99
Sarbanes-Oxley affects the ability of small firms to
develop by effectively keeping many of them out of the
public capital markets, and financially handicapping those
able to stomach the costs.100

This affront to the economic

and social well-being of this country could only be
justified if the corresponding investor protection either
is more important or offers more benefits than it costs.
C.

Protecting Access to the Public Capital Markets

Whether for economic or political reasons, government
policy should promote the growth and well-being of small
firms.

What is less obvious is how important it is for

small firms to be able to go public.

The primary benefit

to firms is that they can better finance their business,
complete key acquisitions and grow.

Public offerings offer

a more valuable security to the public than exempt
offerings,101 and offer them to a much larger market.102

The

result is a much higher demand for their securities.103

A

corollary to that is that managers have more incentive to
start the ventures in the first place, since their own
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stock in the company is more valuable if publicly
tradable.104

Of course, depriving businesses of these

benefits would only implicate public policy if it affected
the public at large.
One way that better financed small businesses benefit
the general public is that it improves the economy as a
whole.

As discussed above, the importance of small

business to the economy is that they are the seeds of the
economy’s renewal process.105

Without public market

financing, small businesses are less able to develop and
market new technology.

In essence, making better financing

available to small businesses keeps industry alive and
kicking.
A second benefit is to investors; going public makes
these companies more available to investors, and also
increases the value of investing in them.

Although

registered public offerings are not the only way to sell
securities, exemptions to registration are highly
technical, and an offering fitting one will not be
available to most investors.106

Even if it is available,

the lack of a public market and rules against resale reduce
the security’s value.107

The result is that the ability for

small business to go public benefits the investor as much
as it benefits the business.
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The public policy concerns on both sides of the
Sarbanes-Oxley debate are essential.

In a perfect world,

neither should be furthered at the expense of the other.
As it is, government policy must weigh the costs to one
side with the benefits to the other.

The problem is that

the Act has had a minimal effect on fraud prevention and
investor confidence,108 while making it prohibitive for
small businesses to enter the public finance markets.109
This discrepancy mandates relief to small firms, at least
from the most costly aspects of the Act.

IV.

The Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley
A.

What Did Sarbanes-Oxley Accomplish?

The goal of Sarbanes-Oxley, and § 404 in particular,
was to prevent financial reporting fraud and improve
investor confidence.110

In its attempt to accomplish these

goals, Congress designed the Act to improve the accuracy of
periodic reports and increase management’s
accountability.111

Ostensibly, controls on financial

reports and a higher likelihood of being held accountable
would reduce the incidence of fraud.

Less fraud, along

with the impression that financial reports were more
accurate, would supposedly boost investment.112
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Whether the Act accomplished these goals is unclear at
best, with many commenters arguing that it has done almost
nothing for either fraud prevention or investor
confidence.113

The evidence that it is working is so far

limited to anecdotes and inferences from indirect
statistics.

For example, in 2005 there were a record

number of amendments to financial statements.114

Some

commentators attribute this at lease in part to SarbanesOxley, particularly the recent implementation of § 404.115
Supposedly, this is evidence that financial reporting is
becoming more accurate.116

Others argue that these

restatements do not represent the Act’s true target;
rather, these are just the honest companies complying with
the more stringent requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, the same
way they complied with the previous requirements.117
Further, it is uncertain whether investors will
characterize the increase in restatements as better
accuracy in financial information, or as evidence of how
inaccurate it was before the restatement.118

The effect on

investor confidence is thus ambiguous.
Other potential evidence involves the mandated changes
in corporate makeup; the new requirement that audit
committees be made up entirely of outside directors has
arguably increased the quality of boards of directors.119
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Another more certain effect is that the Act has
significantly changed the accounting profession.120

There

is no question that auditors are being more thorough.
Public company accountants now have the kind of leverage
over their clients necessary to keep from being bullied,
the way Arthur Anderson was by Enron.121

There are

questions, however, as to whether this has had any actual
effect on fraud prevention.
In fact, there is highly partisan debate as to whether
any of the evidence indicates an effect on fraud.122
Analysts claiming that it does are generally accountants or
SEC employees, and so lack impartiality.123

Likewise,

analysts claiming that it does not are generally probusiness.124

Despite the disagreement, it will be several

years before any data is available on the actual incidence
of fraud.

The costs to small issuers, however, are far

more certain.
B.

What Were the Effects on Small Business?125
1.

The Pre-Implementation Outlook

The projected business costs of implementing § 404,
especially with regards to small businesses, paled in
comparison to the current figures.

The SEC estimated that

the average company would require 383 hours to implement,
assess, and audit internal controls, costing only $35,286
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per company in outside professional fees.126

Further, the

SEC concluded that the costs to smaller firms would be much
less than that.127

It reasoned that due to the far less

complex internal controls of smaller firms, § 404 costs
would be significantly less.128

Finally, it assumed that

most costs of compliance would be from designing and
implementing the internal controls, which would be incurred
in the first year.

Accordingly, it predicted that costs

would be much less from the second year on.129

In fact, one

study concluded that the imposition of such a rigid
structure for internal controls would actually increase
efficiency, since in recent years a “‘corner-cutting’
culture” among companies had led to lack of structure and
hurt efficiency.130
The public comments received by the SEC on the
proposed rules firmly disagreed.

Most commenters argued

that that the SEC vastly underestimated the number of hours
companies would need to assess and audit the internal
controls.131

One commenter even postured that the figures

were off by a factor of 100.132

Moreover, many believed

that the costs would not be proportionally lower for
smaller firms.133

The SEC’s only response to these concerns

was to only require § 404 compliance in the annual report
(Form 10-k).134
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2.

Actual Effects to Date

According to mounting evidence, the public comments
were right.

Even ignoring the effects on small businesses,

§ 404 implementation is lot more costly in general than the
SEC expected: costs are about four times higher across the
board.135

Also, many firms have now faced two years of §

404 compliance, but the rapid decline in costs regulators
expected has not happened.136

It is possible that the high

costs still reflect implementation, and so will eventually
decline.

The fact that the companies in this sample are

“accelerated filers,”137 and thus are more experienced and
better funded than most small businesses, makes that
argument rather weak.
The most certain error, however, has been the
disproportionate effects of § 404 on small public
companies.138

Relative to their market floats, small-cap

issuers will incur much higher costs than large companies,
with some estimating that audit costs could triple,
quadruple, or more.139

According to an interview with one

securities law practitioner, the typical cost of compliance
has risen from around $25,000 to $200,000 per year.140

Of

course, high costs alone are not compelling enough to
mandate government policy; with the privilege of being a
public company comes obligations to the public, and § 404
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is part of those obligations.

Rather, it is the effect

these high costs have on society and the economy that
implicates public policy.
The key effect is that the cost of § 404 is keeping
small businesses out of the public capital markets.

The

last two years have been wrought with stories of small
companies de-registering their stock, saying that the cost
of being a public company has become prohibitive.141

One

analyst’s study revealed that among the businesses that delisted, compliance costs swallowed nearly a third of the
firm’s profits.142

Some analysts claim this is not the norm

for small public companies, but the issue is not just
whether current public companies can stay public, but
whether small firms in the future will go public at all.
Since the initial registration process is a significant
cost in itself, the marginal cost of going public is
significantly higher than that of staying public.143

The

most troubling fact is that the number of small company
public offerings has significantly decreased recently,
despite the fact that the SEC has not yet implemented § 404
for small firms.144

Thus, the mere possibility of having to

face the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley in the future could be
enough to damage the economy.

The bottom line is that §
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404 is making it more difficult for small companies to go
public, and to some extent to stay public.
Since § 404 is not yet in effect for small businesses,
this evidence illustrates only the tip of the iceberg of
what the Act will do not to only small business, but to the
economy as a whole.

The most compelling reason to

readdress the costs of § 404 is the economic impact it will
have in the long run.
3.

The Long Term Economic Outlook

The long run effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on the economy
could be devastating.

Small businesses will face

compliance costs that make it difficult, if not impossible,
to enter the capital market.145

As such, small businesses

will be under-funded and unable to develop.

With the

modern understanding of the importance of small firms to
industry,146 analysts can now predict the macroeconomic
impact.

With small firms unable to capitalize on the new

knowledge they bring to industry, they are unable to act as
agents of change.

Essentially, if small business does not

grow, the entirety of industry does not grow.
does not develop.

Fewer new jobs appear.

Technology

Profits

disappear.
Further, the decline of industry affects not only the
involved businesses, but the economy as a whole.
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The

stranglehold on small business puts the entire industry at
a cost, efficiency and technology disadvantage to foreign
firms.147

One of many macroeconomic implications is that

the trade deficit, already a cause for concern, may get
worse.148

If the burden on small business is not lifted,

there will be at the very least a noticeable strain on the
economy.

If small business is as important to America’s

economy as recent studies suggest, that strain could lead
to mass unemployment, a deflated standard of living, and
the end of any industrial dominance this country may still
have.

V.

Weighing Public Policy
Neither of the competing interests is compellingly

more important or more fundamental than the other.

While

the bias towards investors in the Act itself might suggest
such a bias in Congress, it is more credible to believe the
Act was a hasty reaction to a sudden surge in the call for
investor protection.149

In fact, the evidence is that the

political pendulum has swung the other way.

Even Senator

Oxley has expressed a willingness to revise the Act.150

The

one thing this political fence-sitting demonstrates is that
there must be balance between the two competing interests.
Accordingly, a change in securities policy should only
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occur if the total benefits outweigh the total costs.
While neither the benefits nor the costs of regulation are
easily quantifiable, and are fairly subjective depending on
one’s point of view, it is undeniable that the benefits of
Sarbanes-Oxley do not outweigh its costs.
First, even if the Act had accomplished all of its
stated goals, the costs to small businesses and the
resulting harm to the economy are so exorbitant that the
ends do not justify the means.

As one analyst put it, “‘I

think what ultimately is going to happen is in an attempt
to capture a few bad guys, you not only extinguish the
spirit of entrepreneurialism, you extinguish the spirit of
capitalism, and you introduce the kinds of bureaucracy that
will make America less competitive over time . . . .’”151
While this trivializes the goals of the Act a bit, it
reflects the reality that a boost in investor confidence is
trivial compared to the economic impact the Act could have.
Congress wanted to make sure that companies, even small
ones, are not reporting profits that are not there.

Their

solution: make sure there are no profits to report.
Another way to put it is in purely economic terms.
The ultimate goal of congress, putting aside the ethical
problem of fraud, was to stimulate the market by increasing
investor confidence.

In doing so, it has crippled the
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ability for most small firms to enter the market, and as a
result has caused more harm to the market than good.

Even

if investors are confident in financial accuracy, they now
have fewer places to invest.

There is also reason to

believe that any positive effect on investor confidence
might be counterbalanced by an even larger negative
effect.152
Moreover, it is not even clear that § 404, the
catalyst of these enormous costs, is either effective or
necessary to protect investors from small business fraud.
Some commenters believe that the extensive internal
controls required by § 404 are just controls for controls’
sake, and do not actually prevent fraud any more than the
internal controls currently used.153

They make more sense

in large companies, where the financial structure is so
complex that there needs to be a high standard for internal
controls.

In small firms, even a drastically reduced

standard for internal controls may be sufficient, since the
structure is far less complex and the financial condition
of the company is much more transparent.
Further, in the case of small firms it seems that
other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are more than sufficient
to accomplish the Act’s purpose.

Already there is an

increased ability to prosecute executives, since the
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certification requirement takes away the unawareness
defense.154

Also, the enhanced independence of both the

audit committee and the auditor take away the problem of
leverage,155 which ensures that an audit will not be the
tongue-in-cheek farce that it had been with Enron and
Worldcom.

Auditors now have every incentive to report

discrepancies to the audit committee, and have none to help
management cover it up.156
In addition, recent history strongly suggests that
investor confidence is not affected by financial reporting
fraud in small firms nearly as much as in large firms.

The

type of fraud Sarbanes-Oxley was designed to prevent has
existed for decades in smaller firms,157 but investor
confidence was not substantially affected until a handful
of large companies were caught.

The implication is that

investor confidence is shaken far more by frauds in two or
three Fortune 500 firms (in fact, enough to compel a
Congressional mandate) than in hundreds of smaller firms.
Sarbanes-Oxley may be necessary to protect investor
confidence, but not when it comes to small issuers.
Another interesting, though troubling perspective is
that at some point preventing fraud is no longer a
compelling policy concern: “[l]ike it or not, a certain
amount of fraud is optimal.”158
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Eventually the cost of

preventing one more fraud becomes more than it is worth,
even to the potential victim.

While shareholders prefer

not to be defrauded, they also prefer to own stock in a
profitable company.

That requires that management engage

in profitable activity, and the time spent on fraud
prevention is time taken away from such activities.159

From

this point of view, it is possible that even investors feel
the tremendous costs of § 404.
Even if investors do not consciously feel the effects,
a certain amount of fraud on financial reports could
actually be more important to investor confidence than the
belief that the reports are accurate.
case for two reasons.

This seems to be the

First, when companies include

projections in their financial reports, missing
expectations by even one cent per share can affect their
market capitalizations by billions of dollars.160

This puts

tremendous pressure on companies to falsify reports.161

The

argument can be made that such fraud is acceptable so long
as the misstatement is (1) minimal, and (2) intended to
assuage investor confidence and protect the capital market
systems.

While no one could argue that Enron was good for

investors, reporting earnings at $5.25 per share instead of
$5.23, when done to protect the market, is hardly worthy of
twenty years in a federal prison.
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Second, the corrections to financial reports caused by
heightened sensitivity under Sarbanes-Oxley could actually
hurt investor confidence.162

In 2005, a record of around

1,200 such restatements were made, often leading to a sharp
decline in stock price.163

Ostensibly, the heightened

sensitivity was intended to improve investors’ belief in
the accuracy of these reports,164 but the empirical results
disagree.

Even though most of these restatements are

“[h]onest companies . . . just doing their best to keep
their books accurate,”165 the government’s efforts to
prevent fraud have actually hurt investor confidence.

The

implication is that there may be public policy reasons to
let these companies hide minor discrepancies, ironically to
protect investor confidence.
While no one could argue that fraud should be
encouraged, at some point it becomes counterproductive to
keep enhancing fraud prevention.

Sarbanes-Oxley is a prime

example of a laudable goal costing more that it’s worth.

VI.

Possible Solutions
Analysts have proffered four potential solutions to

the problem small firms have with § 404: complete
exemption, partial exemption, better guidance, and reduced
standards.

Some believed that the disproportionate impact
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on small business was due to their inexperience, and to the
lack of formal structure in their internal controls.166
This implied two things.

First, once a formal, systematic

set of controls was established, the costs to small
business would decrease dramatically.167

Second, regulators

could significantly reduce costs to small business by
providing a clearer, more structured guidance as to what
kinds of controls are required, and how to maintain them.168
The problem with this theory is that they have already done
that,169 and it has done nothing to calm the protests.

Even

with a crystal clear understanding of what types of
controls the SEC expects, the costs will still be
astronomical.
What most small business advocates have promoted is
complete exemption from § 404.

In fact, this is what the

SEC’s own advisory committee has recommended for smaller
firms.170

Since the impact of § 404 is undeniably greater

than the intended benefits, this seems to be the best
course of action.
It is also possible to reduce the impact of § 404
without completely removing its protections.

The advisory

committee recommended that, for mid-cap issuers, the SEC
retain the requirements on internal controls but exempt the
firms from having them audited.171
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This would remove the

bulk of the cost while still requiring the rigid structure
that the SEC believes will reduce the incidence of fraud.
Another possibility is reducing the requirements for
internal controls while keeping the audit.

The much

simpler structure of small firms’ financial organization
justifies a much simpler structure in internal controls.
If this can be done while maintaining adequate fraud
protection, not only will it reduce the costs of
implementing the controls, but also reduce the cost of the
audit.

Whether this is possible and how it could be done,

however, is beyond the scope of this note.

VII. Conclusion and Prospects for Change
Public Policy demands that some measure be taken to
reduce the Sarbanes-Oxley burden on small business, whether
by exempting small firms from all or part of § 404, or by
somehow making the requirements proportional to business
size.172

The problem is that while the SEC is quick to

issue hasty rules in response to a perceived threat, it is
much slower to fix them once unintended and unduly harsh
consequences have been revealed.173
The Commission has not been completely deaf to these
concerns.

In response to the public outcry against § 404,

the SEC has taken small steps to address the concerns of
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small issuers.

First, it delayed the compliance date for

smaller firms by a year.174

The Commission believed that

the delay would solve the problem by reducing the initial
costs of implementing internal controls, which further
demonstrates how vastly it underestimated the continuing
cost burdens on small public companies.175
Second, and perhaps more significantly, the SEC
commissioned an advisory panel to assess the effects of the
new regulations on small business and propose changes.176
The panel recently came back with its recommendations,
proposing to exempt companies with market capitalizations
less than $700 million from having their internal controls
certified by independent auditors, and exempt companies
with less than $100 million in public float from § 404
altogether.177
Whether the SEC will respond, and respond adequately,
is a tenuous proposition.

Commissioning the advisory

committee is a good sign; at the very least the Commission
recognizes that a problem exists and that some measure must
be taken.

Another good sign is that when SEC Chairman

Christopher Cox took his position last year, he expected to
use whatever recommendations the committee had.178

In

general, the political pendulum seems to be swinging
towards relief.

On the other hand, it has been months
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since the advisory panel has come back with its
recommendations, and while the Commission has acted quickly
on its recommendations about foreign issuers, it has so far
dragged its feet on the small business issue.

Also, most

in Congress expect that the Act itself will not be
amended.179

Change will have to come from the SEC itself,

which has always been hesitant to relax its regulations.180
The advisory committee’s recommendation is as broad a
stroke to help small business as the Act was to protect
investors.

The SEC has said before that, despite the high

costs, it did not want to exempt small business from §
404.181

The Commission must changes its stance, or else

watch America’s small businesses falter, and bring the
entire American economy down with it.
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